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Abstract The UK voted by a narrow margin to leave the European Union in a ref-
erendum on 23 June 2016. This article examines why this was the result and brings 
out comparative implications. Building on previous findings that expectations about 
the impact of Brexit were central to voters’ decisions, we seek to improve under-
standing of how these expectations mattered. On average across a range of issues, 
our analysis suggests that Leave would have won if voters had expected things to 
stay much the same following Brexit. A big exception is immigration, for which 
“no change” is associated with Remain voting. But there was a clear expectation 
that immigration would fall after Brexit (as most voters wanted). That consideration 
strengthened the Leave vote, and did so sufficiently to overwhelm a more important 
but less widely and strongly held expectation that the economy would suffer. We 
also find that those who were uncertain about where Brexit might lead were more 
likely to back the status quo. This supports a posited tendency towards status quo 
bias in referendum voting, notwithstanding a widespread belief that this bias failed 
to materialize in the Brexit vote. Our methods and findings have valuable implica-
tions for comparative research.
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Introduction
Referendums on European matters take many forms. The Dutch referendum of 
April 2016 was a citizen-initiated vote on a relatively peripheral matter. The ref-
erendum held in the United Kingdom 11 weeks later was initiated by government 
and concerned the most fundamental EU question that could be asked in a single 
country: whether to remain a member. Despite this difference in structure, the 
outcome resembled that in the Netherlands: the European project and the bulk of 
the domestic political establishment were defeated. In the UK’s case, this was no 
minor inconvenience. It was the greatest policy failure for any UK government 
since the Suez crisis of 1956—indeed, at least one former prime minister said it 
was worse (The Scotsman 2016). It was also the greatest setback for the EU in the 
organization’s history. Its repercussions will likely dominate UK—and, to a lesser 
extent, EU—politics for years.
Existing studies have already shed considerable light on how this unexpected 
outcome came about. We seek here to build on that work, specifically by examin-
ing how expectations of the effects of the decision on Brexit affected voting. We 
adopt this focus for three reasons, which we elaborate in depth below. First, vot-
ers in the UK long held a largely instrumental view of EU membership, weighing 
it in terms of its perceived costs and benefits. This implies that voters’ decisions 
on whether to remain in the EU should have involved calculations of those costs 
and benefits too. Second, the comparative literature on referendum voting leads to 
the expectation that voting in a high-salience referendum such as this should have 
been strongly influenced by issue perceptions. Third, the emerging literature on 
the Brexit referendum itself supports the same conclusion.
We thus take a predominantly issue-based model as our focus. Moreover, the 
issues we expect mattered most and focus on are the prospective ones about the 
future outside as opposed to inside the EU. We consider what people’s expecta-
tions were about the consequences of leaving for a variety of social and economic 
outcomes, how these changed over the campaign, and how they affected voting.
In addition, while examining the effects of these expectations in general, we 
also give particular attention to one aspect of them: namely, uncertainty. That 
is, we look at the effects of not having clear expectations. We again do this for 
three reasons. First, politicians’ and campaigners’ assumptions about the effects 
of uncertainty were central to the real-world dynamics of the referendum. Spe-
cifically, campaigners on both sides assumed that uncertainty would lead voters 
to favour the status quo, which affected how they campaigned and, indeed, why 
Prime Minister David Cameron called the referendum in the first place. Second, 
the role of uncertainty in shaping the dynamics of opinion during referendum 
campaigns is an important but understudied aspect of referendums in general. 
Third, while this aspect of opinion formation has received attention in studies 
specifically of the Brexit referendum, we believe that this work has had major 
limitations. We adopt what we think is a methodologically innovative approach to 
take it further.
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The first two sections of this article prepare the ground by elaborating upon 
the points set out in the preceding paragraphs. Section  “Background: origins and 
dynamics of the Brexit referendum” explores the background to the 2016 Brexit 
referendum, focusing particularly on what it tells us about underlying opinion and 
expectations. Section  “Explaining the referendum outcome” examines the com-
parative literature on referendum voting and the emerging literature on the Brexit 
referendum to build the foundations for our own expectations. It states hypotheses 
that we subsequently test. Section  “Data” describes our data and methods. Sec-
tion  “Analysis” analyses these data, looking at how evolving expectations of the 
effects of remaining in or leaving the EU affected vote choice. Section “Conclusion” 
draws out conclusions and comparative implications.
We find that Remain campaigners lost, above all, because they failed to convince 
enough voters that leaving the EU would cause economic harm. By contrast, most 
voters did think Brexit would bring the benefit (as they saw it) of lower immigration. 
Voters who were uncertain of Brexit’s effects were more likely to support the status 
quo than those who thought Brexit would make no difference. Both our methods and 
our findings have important comparative implications.
Background: origins and dynamics of the Brexit referendum
Voters in the UK have long differed from those in most other European countries 
in their scepticism towards the EU and the “European project”. They have rarely 
thought themselves European, let alone believed in the vision of ever closer Euro-
pean integration: the annual British Social Attitudes (BSA) survey has never seen 
the proportion of respondents professing a European identity rise above one-sixth 
(Curtice 2016a, p. 11); the proportion wanting increased EU powers has been a sixth 
or lower in all years but one since 1998 (Curtice 2016a, p. 6). Most Britons have 
viewed EU membership as purely transactional.
As Evans et al. (2018) argue, this underlying Euroscepticism is important back-
ground for any analysis of the Brexit referendum. But it does not on its own explain 
why the referendum was called. While voters were sceptical of the EU, this was not 
an issue to which they devoted much attention. By the time David Cameron pledged 
to hold the referendum, in January 2013, the Ipsos MORI issues index, which asks 
respondents what the important issues facing Britain are, had not seen mentions of 
EU membership or powers hit double figures since June 2005—see the thick black 
line in Fig. 1. Only in 2016, as the referendum itself approached, did this issue rise 
to any prominence.
Rather, Cameron made his pledge in part because of hostility towards the EU 
within his own Conservative Party (Oliver 2016, pp. 9–10; The Economist 2013a) 
and in part under the impact of sections of public opinion as mediated through 
the party system. As Fig. 1 shows, while few voters took much interest in the EU 
per se, immigration (shown by the thick grey line) had long been a major concern, 
fuelled in part by high immigration from the East European countries that joined 
the EU in 2004. This fed rising support for the anti-EU UK Independence Party 
(UKIP), which averaged just over 10% across 27 polls completed in December 2012 
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(authors’ calculation from data in UK Polling Report 2017), compared to 3.1% in 
the 2010 general election (BBC News 2010). Many Conservatives saw this as a 
threat to their own electoral chances and “delighted in the prospect of spiking the 
guns of the UK Independence Party” through the referendum pledge (The Econo-
mist 2013a). Cameron may also have hoped that his pledge would limit any electoral 
threat from Labour, which faced a quandary in deciding whether to match it (The 
Economist 2013b).
Cameron’s pledge thus reflected the exigencies of managing his own party 
internally and seeking electoral advantage over competing parties. In addition, 
it emerged amidst a political discourse that for several decades had increasingly 
linked EU debates to the idea of holding some kind of referendum. Such referen-
dum talk had first mushroomed in 1991–1992 during debates over the Maastricht 
Treaty. From 1997 onwards, all three main parties—the Conservatives, Labour, 
and the Liberal Democrats—had made EU-related referendum pledges in every 
one of their general election manifestos. Thus, by the time of David Cameron’s 




















































































Fig. 1  Ipsos MORI Issues Index: Top Ten Issues, January 2005–November 2016. Notes: Ipsos-MORI 
asks two open-ended questions: ‘What would you say is the most important issue facing Britain today?’; 
and ‘What do you see as other important issues facing Britain today?’ Figures show the percentage of 
respondents giving a response falling within each category in response to either question. Ipsos-MORI 
divided the ‘Race relations/immigration/immigrants’ category in 2015 into ‘Race relations’ and ‘Immi-
gration’. We have added these categories together in order to maintain continuity across years. The immi-
gration category has varied between 34 and 56%; the race relations category has ranged from 0 to 7% 
(the highest figure being in July 2016, immediately after the referendum) Source: Ipsos-MORI (2017)
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The crucial final spur to Cameron’s pledge was his expectation that he would 
win the referendum. This expectation had two roots. First, the early polls put 
Remain ahead: across all the polls conducted between September 2015 (when 
the final wording of the referendum question was decided) and 20 February 2016 
(when the referendum date was announced), Remain support (excluding don’t 
knows) averaged 53% (authors’ calculation from data at What UK Thinks 2017). 
Second, the government drew from past referendums the lesson that opinion tends 
to shift towards the status quo as polling day approaches.
Indeed, this was a key assumption made by campaigners, pollsters, and com-
mentators across the board. Both campaigns assumed that voters—particularly 
swing voters—would be risk-averse. A diplomatic memo leaked a year before the 
referendum said Cameron “believes that people will ultimately vote for the status 
quo if the alternatives can be made to appear risky” (Nardelli and Watt 2015). 
Cameron’s Director of Communications says the Remain campaign “assumed the 
undecideds would turn to the status quo. … It had been the case at the general 
election and the pattern of the vast majority of referenda around the world. The 
reason for this is that the status quo is almost invariably the less risky option—the 
alternative, in our words, ‘a leap in the dark.’” Oliver (2016, p. 385). The Leave 
campaign, meanwhile, sought to undermine the idea that a Remain vote would 
simply preserve the status quo: the Chief Executive of Vote Leave, Matthew Elli-
ott, says, “one of our key objectives in the campaign was to basically show the 
status quo wasn’t an option” (Bennett 2016, p. 294). Vote Leave’s key slogan—
“Take back control”—was meant to evoke the idea of a return to something more 
secure (Cummings 2017). Leave campaigners pushed the possibility of Turkish 
EU membership and the creation of an EU army to promote the idea that staying 
Fig. 2  Vote intention polls with separate lowess smoothers for online and telephone modes
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in was a risk not worth taking (e.g. Bennett 2016, pp. 292–4). They even pro-
duced condoms printed with the slogans “The safe choice” and “It’s riskier to 
stay in” (Bennett 2016, p. 227).
Figure  2 shows the basic pattern of support for Remain as revealed in polls 
between September 2015 and referendum day. Three key features can be highlighted. 
First, while Remain generally led in the early polls, the size of that lead depended 
greatly on the polling method: telephone polls showed a very large advantage for 
Remain, while online polls showed a much more balanced race. The reasons for this 
difference were subject to much speculation and analysis (e.g. Curtice 2016b; Singh 
and Kanagasooriam 2016), but remain unclear. The divergence means we can be 
less certain about where opinion stood at the start of the campaign than we might 
hope. Second, there is no sign, in either polling mode, of any aggregate shift in opin-
ion towards the status quo. Third, the two modes suggest different conclusions as to 
how far opinion in fact moved away from the status quo: telephone polls showed a 
large shift; online polls showed only a marginal change.
This overall pattern raises the question of whether the usual break towards the 
status quo among uncertain voters in fact failed to materialize. Campaigners cer-
tainly thought so. According to Oliver (2016, p. 385), the Remain campaign’s 
internal analysis concluded that, in the key swing voter groups, “a narrow majority 
thought that remaining was more risky. They believed that staying in the EU meant 
continued uncontrolled immigration and spending £350 million a week on the EU, 
not the NHS”. Dominic Cummings, Campaign Director of Vote Leave, says, “the 
now-mocked conventional wisdom that ‘the status quo almost always wins in refer-
endums like this’ obviously has a lot of truth to it and it only proved false this time 
because of a combination of events that was improbable”. We shall examine below 
whether these interpretations are justified.
Explaining the referendum outcome
The comparative study of referendum voting has advanced considerably over the 
past quarter century. As it developed in the 1990s and early 2000s, this literature fell 
largely into two main camps. First, issue-based models posited that voters decide 
on the basis of their perceptions of the issues in the referendum question (e.g. Siune 
and Svensson 1993; Svensson 2002). Second, cue-based models proposed that vot-
ers decide on the basis of the “cues” provided by parties and politicians: either they 
treat cues as information shortcuts and vote with the politicians they trust (Lupia 
1994), or they treat referendums as second-order contests and punish the politi-
cians they dislike (Franklin et al. 1995). More recent research typically blends these 
approaches: issue voting tends to grow the higher the salience of the issue in ques-
tion; cues gain importance as salience falls (e.g. Franklin 2002; Garry et al. 2005; 
Hobolt 2009; Hobolt and Brouard 2011; Schuck and De Vreese 2008; Svensson 
2007; for an overview, see Renwick 2017, pp. 443–448).
Brexit was clearly an exceptionally salient issue, producing the highest turnout 
in a UK-wide vote for almost a quarter of a century. This leads us to posit that issue 
voting should have mattered.
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The emerging literature on the Brexit referendum itself supports this hypothe-
sis. That literature is already rich. Some authors focus on particular factors: Euro-
sceptic attitudes (Evans et al. 2018); concerns about immigration (Goodwin and 
Milazzo 2017); divisions between those who attended university and others (e.g. 
Evans and Tilley 2017, pp. 201–206); voting among traditional white working 
class voters who feel neglected by the main parties (Ford and Goodwin 2017); 
and economic deprivation and insecurity (Becker et al. 2017; Halikiopoulou and 
Vlandas 2018). Other studies that examine the impacts of a broad range of poten-
tial causal factors are particularly instructive. Clarke et al. (2017, p. 456) argue 
that a combination of factors were relevant for the Brexit referendum, but that 
issue-based cost/benefit assessments were most important. Hobolt (2016) tests 
four models of the determinants of the vote and finds the issue voting model to 
have the highest explained variance (pseudo R-squared), suggesting that issue 
voting was “the most proximal cause of vote choice” (Hobolt 2016, p. 1270). 
Curtice (2017a) conducts a similar exercise and concludes that both issue voting 
and identity-based voting mattered. On the former, he says:
Of all the variables that were potential candidates for inclusion in our 
model, the perceived impact of leaving the EU on the economy proved to 
be the variable that was most strongly related to how people voted, and it 
remained strongly related even after the inclusion of other variables. Those 
who thought the economy would suffer as a result of leaving the EU were 
much less likely to vote to leave the EU than were those who thought it 
would be strengthened. (Curtice 2017a, p. 31).
These findings further ground our initial expectation, that issue voting mattered 
and that investigating further its internal workings is worthwhile.
As we noted in outlining the background to the Brexit referendum, one aspect 
of issue voting that particularly mattered to politicians and campaigners was 
the belief that uncertainty breeds caution and tends to produce a shift towards 
the status quo as voters’ minds focus with increasing seriousness on the choice 
before them. Such beliefs are widespread among political activists in many coun-
tries, and as such deserve careful analysis. So far, however, they have received 
only limited attention from political scientists. In a study of the UK’s previous 
national referendum—a vote on the electoral system in 2011—Whiteley et  al. 
(2013) posited a tendency for opinion to shift towards the status quo; they chris-
tened this pattern “LeDuc’s Law”, attributing its identification to LeDuc (2003). 
In fact, however, LeDuc stated no such general pattern, emphasizing, rather, the 
unpredictability of opinion change during referendum campaigns (LeDuc 2003, 
p. 165). Clarke et al. return to this theme in their study of the 2016 referendum. 
They posit:
Prior to the beginning of a referendum campaign sizable numbers of people 
tell pollsters that they support the change being proposed. But, as the cam-
paign progresses and decision day nears, some have misgivings, reconsider 
and, after a period of indecision, end up voting to keep things as they are. 
(Clarke et al. 2017, p. 445)
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They test this through a measure of voters’ perceptions of the riskiness of leav-
ing the EU, ranging from 0 (“not risky”) to 10 (“very risky”). We have profound 
misgivings about this, however, as a way to test a hypothesis about uncertainty. 
Respondents who thought leaving the EU “very risky” were not uncertain: rather, 
they were very confident that Brexit posed major dangers. We therefore develop 
an alternative approach below. This focuses specifically on voters who said they 
were uncertain as to what the effects of Brexit would be.
In sum, taking our cue from campaigners, comparative political scientists, and 
students of the Brexit referendum itself, we focus mainly on issue-based voting. 
Our main contribution to the debate on voting at the Brexit referendum is not to 
establish that issue voting mattered but to elucidate how it mattered. We focus 
particularly on voter expectations about the consequences of leaving, uncertainty 
in those expectations, and how those things changed over the campaign.
The theoretical analysis above, combined with the findings of existing studies of 
the Brexit referendum, leads us to formulate four hypotheses:
H1 Expectations of the effects of Brexit influence voting: an expectation of a 
harmful effect boosts support for Remain, and vice versa.
H2 Those who are uncertain of the effects of Brexit are more likely to support the 
status quo than those who think Brexit will have no effect.
H3 This uncertainty should fall as the campaign proceeds and voters receive more 
information.
H4 If their indecision is rooted in uncertainty, voters who are undecided between 
Leave and Remain should ultimately opt for the status quo. But their indecision 
could also derive from indifference, leading to no expected skew either way.
We do not, however, make hypotheses about the content of people’s expectations: 
these are to be discovered through empirical analysis. While the discussion above 
of the background to the referendum leads to some hunches in this respect—such as 
that most UK voters would likely be sceptical of any positive effects of EU member-
ship—we confine our hypotheses to points that are theoretically grounded.
Data
We use the British Election Study (BES) internet panel, administered by YouGov. 
This is a multiwave panel study that started in 2014 and continued beyond the ref-
erendum. The main waves of interest here are the pre-referendum campaign wave 7 
(14th April—4th May 2016), the rolling campaign wave 8 (6th May—22nd June), 
and the post-referendum wave 9 (24th June—4th July 2016). The rolling campaign 
wave 8 involved daily random samples allowing us to analyse the dynamics of opin-
ion over the final 2 months of the campaign.
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Given what we have seen about the divergence between telephone and online 
polls, the fact that the BES uses an online panel is likely to affect our conclusions. 
While relative support for Remain over Leave declined during the campaign for both 
kinds of polls, the trend was much more dramatic in telephone polls, especially over 
the final 2 months that are our main focus. Self-selected online panels have dispro-
portionately highly politically engaged respondents who may have formed opinions 
early and been relatively unlikely to change them. This might be particularly the 
case for the BES panel for which half the wave 7 and 8 respondents also completed 
all of waves 1–6: they had been willing to complete eight lengthy questionnaires on 
politics in 2 years. The panel data are thus likely to understate the degree of change. 
There are no telephone polls with repeated questions during the final 2 months on 
perceptions of the consequences of Brexit with which we can compare our findings. 
Still, it is comforting that the trends in the online and telephone poll vote inten-
tion figures are in the same direction and that the error in the final online polls was 
smaller than in the telephone polls.
Thinking of the referendum decision as a cost/benefit calculation, it matters what 
people thought would happen if Britain left compared with remaining in the EU. So 
we focus on questions asked in waves 7 and 8 of the BES about expectations of the 
potential effects of leaving the EU on ten specific dimensions:
• Regarding working conditions for British workers, the general economic situa-
tion in the UK and “my personal financial situation”, respondents were asked 
“Do you think the following would be better, worse or about the same if the UK 
leaves the European Union?” The response options were on a five-point scale 
from “much worse” to “much better”.
• Regarding unemployment, international trade, immigration to the UK, the risk 
of terrorism and Britain’s influence in the world, the question was “Do you think 
the following would be higher, lower or about the same if the UK leaves the 
European Union?” Again there was a five-point response scale, this time from 
“much lower” to “much higher”.
• Finally, respondents were asked “If the UK *leaves* the European Union, how 
much more likely is it that big companies would leave the UK” and a similar 
question about the likelihood that “Scotland would leave the UK”. The five-point 
response scale for these questions ran from “much less likely” to “much more 
likely”.
For the regression models below, these questions were re-centred on a zero mid-
point meaning “about the same”. Our key methodological innovation is that, in order 
to model the effects of voters’ uncertainty about the impact of Brexit, we use sepa-
rate dummy variables to indicate Don’t Know responses to these questions. This is, 
we think, an innovative approach, and it allows a more nuanced analysis of this issue 
than in any previous referendum study.
One concern about expectations questions such as these is that responses will pri-
marily reflect the cognitive biases of those who have already decided what side they 
are on. Responses on different items are often correlated, suggesting some such bias 
(cf. Evans et al. 2018, p. 390). But not all the items are correlated with each other. 
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For two of the main ones, the economy and immigration, there is a reasonable but 
not strong correlation: − 0.31 excluding Don’t Knows. This suggests that respond-
ents were maybe somewhat, but not solely, giving patterned responses reflecting 
their partisan and Eurosceptic/Europhile propensities. For this reason, and because 
we are interested in the relative importance of different issues, we do not combine 
the items into composite indices as Clarke et al. (2017) and Evans et al. (2018) do.
Since one of our hypotheses is that people may have been more inclined to sup-
port the status quo because of uncertainty, we also consider responses to the ques-
tion, “How sure are you about what would happen to the UK if it left the EU or if it 
remained in the EU?” Responses for both Leave and Remain were on a scale of very 
unsure, quite unsure, quite sure, to very sure.
Control variables are detailed in the notes to tables. They are collectively more 
comprehensive than those in previous research. There are some different operation-
alizations but they effectively encompass all the main findings in Hobolt (2016), 
Curtice (2017a) and Clarke et  al. (2017). Overall the choice of control variables 
made little difference to our results.
Analysis
We analyse the evidence in four steps. First, we describe perceptions of the conse-
quences of Brexit in the early stages of the campaign (wave 7). We made no hypoth-
eses about this above, but treat it as a matter for empirical determination. Second, 
we assess whether these perceptions affected vote intention, taking account both 
of positive/negative perceptions (H1) and of uncertainty (H2). Third, we examine 
how perceptions changed between waves 7 and 8 and over the final 2 months of the 
campaign (wave 8). Again, we have not formulated hypotheses for this, except that 
uncertainty should have fallen (H3). Finally, we analyse what the post-referendum 
survey tells us about the impact of perceptions of Brexit’s consequences on vote 
decision at the end of the campaign, allowing us to return to H1 and H2, and to con-
sider how previously undecided voters made up their minds (H4).
What did people think the consequences of Brexit would be?
Table 1 shows that, in the early stages of the campaign, people thought little would 
change if the UK left the EU. This is true of all the issues asked about except the 
chances of Scottish independence (thought to be more likely) and immigration 
(thought likely to fall). For all the other outcomes, “about the same” was the modal 
response, and the balance of opinion was fairly even. On the economic issues the aver-
age view was typically that things would get worse but not by much, and not many 
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more thought this than thought things would get better. The balance of opinion on 
economic issues only marginally favoured Remain, but that on immigration strongly 
favoured Leave: most people wanted immigration to fall; only 17% wanted it to rise.
How did perceptions about the consequences of Brexit affect vote intention?
Table 2 shows two logistic regressions1 of intention to vote Leave instead of Remain 
in wave 7 as a function of responses to the questions listed above about what would 
happen if Britain left the EU. Both models include Don’t Know responses to the 
expectations questions as separate dummy variables. The first model is without con-
trols, while the second includes sociodemographic and attitudinal controls and a 
lagged-dependent variable (wave 6 vote intention). Here and in later tables, introduc-
ing controls substantially reduces the available sample size, but Model 1 coefficients 
barely change if fitted using the same cases as for Model 2 (results not shown).
By comparison with a model using sociodemographic controls only (not shown), 
inclusion of attitudinal control variables (such as government approval and leader 
evaluations) increases the R-squared by 0.07 and does not change the general pat-
tern of coefficient size and direction. This implies that issue-based considerations 
Table 1  Perceived consequences of leaving the EU on various issues (%)

















Unemployment 4 18 39 22 6 12
International 
trade
6 25 37 16 4 12
Immigration 15 39 27 6 4 9
Risk of terrorism 5 16 50 14 6 9
Rights for British 
workers
7 19 45 15 3 10
Economy 6 26 33 20 4 12
Your personal 
finances
3 16 57 9 2 14
British influence 
abroad
9 25 41 12 4 9
Risk of big busi-
ness leaving
4 15 32 27 7 17
Risk of Scottish 
independence
2 8 26 29 12 24
1 See, for example, Long and Freese (2005) for model equations. Linear probability regression mod-
els, here and later, give qualitatively very similar results. More detailed analyses with all the expectation 
questions treated as factor variables show that there are deviations in the linearity of relationships, but 
that all relationships are monotone. We present the models assuming linearity because they are much 
more parsimonious. Our conclusions would be stronger, if anything, with full categorization of explana-
tory variables.
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Table 2  Logistic regression 
models of Leave vote intention 
before the official campaign
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. Source: 2015 British Elec-
tion Study internet panel, wave 7, April 2016. Dependent variable: 
Leave = 1, Remain = 0, undecideds and refusals excluded. DK don’t 
know. See text for further details on variable coding. Although the 
coefficients are not shown, model 2 includes controls for age, age 
squared, being Church of England, education (degree, some and no 
educational qualifications), sex, being non-white, housing tenure 
(mortgage, rent publicly, rent privately or own outright), work type 
(approximately social class), household income (deciles as a factor 
variable with DK and refusals as separate categories), region, immi-
gration preferences (from 0 “Allow many fewer” to 10 “Allow many 
more”), 0–10 (dis)like leader ratings (for David Cameron, Jeremy Cor-
byn, Tim Farron, Boris Johnson, Michael Gove and Nigel Farage), a 
seven-point trust in MPs scale, a five-point government (dis)approval 
rating, seven-point English, British and European identity scales, a 
five-point opinion scale on whether the EU has undermined British 
identity, 2015 general election vote and 2015 referendum vote inten-
tion. For attitudinal control variables, undecided respondents were 
reassigned to the mid-point
(1 without controls) (2 with controls)
Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e.
Unemployment W7 − 0.25*** (0.05) − 0.17* (0.08)
Int. trade W7 0.69*** (0.05) 0.66*** (0.07)
Immigration W7 − 0.48*** (0.04) − 0.33*** (0.06)
Terrorism risk W7 − 0.41*** (0.04) − 0.39*** (0.08)
Workers’ rights W7 0.48*** (0.05) 0.06 (0.08)
Economy W7 0.94*** (0.05) 0.78*** (0.08)
Personal finance W7 0.07 (0.08) 0.09 (0.12)
Brit influence W7 0.54*** (0.05) 0.42*** (0.08)
Business leaves W7 − 1.03*** (0.05) − 0.82*** (0.07)
Scot independence W7 − 0.03 (0.04) 0.01 (0.06)
DK unemployment W7 − 0.06 (0.10) 0.17 (0.17)
DK int. trade W7 − 0.00 (0.11) − 0.27 (0.17)
DK immigration W7 − 0.19 (0.13) − 0.07 (0.17)
DK terrorism risk W7 − 0.28* (0.13) − 0.10 (0.17)
DK workers’ rights W7 − 0.21 (0.11) − 0.07 (0.18)
DK economy W7 − 0.12 (0.11) 0.01 (0.17)
DK personal finance W7 − 0.41*** (0.10) − 0.44** (0.16)
DK Brit influence W7 0.25* (0.12) 0.17 (0.18)
DK business leaves W7 0.15* (0.08) 0.12 (0.13)
DK Scot independence 
W7
0.22** (0.07) − 0.11 (0.11)
Intercept 0.11* (0.05) − 0.23 (0.66)
Pseudo R-sq 0.53 0.72
No. of cases 28,044 18,072
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either were much more important than or at least mediated the effects of more gen-
eral political attitudes. More broadly, the fact that the coefficients of the expectation 
terms do not change much after inclusion of controls provides strong evidence that 
there is a causal effect from expectations to vote choice rather than responses to the 
expectation questions merely reflecting the vote intention.2
With so many expectations questions of the same form that are cognitively demand-
ing we might expect substantial multicollinearity problems. Instead, it is remarkable 
that all the questions operate in the expected direction and that all but one (on Scottish 
independence) are statistically significant. All of this fits strongly with H1.
The broad pattern of coefficients fits with research suggesting that the economy 
and immigration were the main issues (Curtice 2017a). The immigration question 
has a negative effect because most people want immigration to fall. For the few who 
want greater immigration there was no statistically significant relationship. Also, 
beliefs about economic consequences are more important the more the respondent 
approved of the government. Other sensible interaction effects have also been identi-
fied in further analysis, but they are not shown because none affect the overall fit of 
the model considerably.3 That perceptions on so many issues work in theoretically 
prescribed ways further indicates a strong cognitive basis to the referendum vote: as 
expected, issue voting mattered.
Model 1 in Table 2 also tells us about the political consequences of those percep-
tions. As we said above, we re-centred the expectation questions so that 0 corre-
sponds to the “about the same” response category (or equivalent). The intercept for 
model 1 of 11 suggests that, had everyone in late April 2016 thought that leaving the 
EU would leave all the factors mentioned unchanged, Leave would have won 53% 
of the vote.4 In fact, the 1% of respondents who actually said little would change 
to all the questions mainly voted Remain. But this was because those who thought 
immigration rates would not change were strongly Remain. Since the model inter-
cept essentially averages across issues it does not let this feature of the immigration 
question responses totally dominate. So we should interpret the intercept as mean-
ing that people would marginally have preferred to leave the EU if they thought it 
would make little social or economic difference to their lives on average across the 
set of issues. This accords with the view that Britain’s membership of the EU has 
long been fundamentally transactional, sustained by the perception of benefits being 
greater than the costs.5
Still, 53% would have been a close result. To win comfortably each side needed 
to develop some kind of advantage in perceived costs and benefits of leaving versus 
remaining. The online polls at the time of wave 7 were showing a neck-and-neck 
3 For instance, expectations about the consequences for the rights of British workers matter more for 
those who want more redistribution.
4 Note that the intercept for model 2 cannot be so interpreted because of the lagged dependent variable 
and controls.
5 The version of the model with expectations as factor variables (in footnote 1) suggests an even stronger 
Leave advantage of 55% among those who thought things would stay much the same after Brexit.
2 A further even stronger test uses wave 8 data with which we can include lagged values of the expecta-
tions variables as well as lagged vote intention and socio-demographics. Such an analysis in effect shows 
that individual-level changes in perceptions are associated with vote intention, in the direction expected, 
for nearly all variables.
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race (see Fig.  2) and the overall BES wave 7 vote intention question had Leave 
on 49% (after excluding Don’t Knows). Since this figure is relatively close to the 
intercept of model 1, public expectations for Brexit, taking account of the relative 
importance of the different issues, must have been balanced only slightly in favour 
of Remain.
We turn now to H2, relating to uncertainty. For all but three of the issues in 
Table 2, the coefficient of Don’t Know is negative. Although they are often statisti-
cally insignificant (especially in model 2), this is due to multicollinearity, and their 
cumulative impact means that those who were unclear what they thought would hap-
pen were more inclined to support the status quo than if they had thought more con-
fidently that Brexit would not change much. This fits with the hypothesis that uncer-
tainty leads people towards the status quo.
This interpretation of the coefficients of “Don’t Know” indicator variables is 
further supported by the models in Table 3, which consider the direct questions in 
wave 7 about certainty over what would happen in the events of a Leave or Remain 
vote. More certainty about what would happen if Leave won is associated with more 
Leave voting and similarly with respect to Remain. Model 2 shows the effects are 
diminished but robust to controlling for all the variables in Table 2 model 2.
How did perceptions of the consequences of Brexit change over the final three 
months?
Having analysed perceptions of Brexit and voting intentions at the start of the cam-
paign, our next step is to consider how these changed over the course of the referendum 
campaign. As before, we do not, for the most part, have prior hypotheses about the 
Table 3  Logistic regressions 
of Leave vote intention on 
assessments of the certainty of 
consequences of leaving the EU 
(pre-campaign)
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. Source: 2015 British Elec-
tion Study internet panel, wave 7, April 2016. Dependent vari-
able: Leave = 1, Remain = 0, undecideds and refusals excluded. DK 
don’t know. See text for further details on variable coding. Model 
2 includes all the variables from Table  2 model 2 as controls but 
parameters not shown
(1 without controls) (2 with controls)
Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e.
Leave certainty W7 1.18*** (0.03) 0.76*** (0.08)
Remain certainty W7 − 0.78*** (0.03) − 0.41*** (0.09)
DK leave certainty W7 0.26* (0.12) − 0.15 (0.32)
DK remain certainty W7 − 0.36** (0.12) − 0.11 (0.33)
Constant 0.15*** (0.02) − 0.02 (0.66)
Pseudo R-sq 0.10 0.72
N. of cases 28,037 18,066
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content of people’s expectations: whether people changed their minds about what they 
thought the consequences of Brexit would be is a matter for empirical examination.
As it turns out, both analysis of changes from wave 7 to wave 8 and analysis of 
trends within wave 8 suggest that expectations changed somewhat, but not much. 
With the exception of trade, between waves 7 and 8, people generally became more 
likely to believe that Brexit would have negative economic consequences and that 
immigration would fall. To this extent they increasingly believed the main planks 
of both the Leave and Remain campaigns.6 It was not simply that prior supporters 
of both sides strengthened their views on the issues that most advantaged their side: 
expectations about the economy and personal finances following Brexit worsened 
for both Remain and Leave supporters. But the changes were modest. The largest 
was on the economy in general, but that was just a 0.07 drop in the mean on the five-
point scale. There were no significant changes between waves 7 and 8 in perceived 
consequences for the risk of terrorism, Scottish independence or British influence 
abroad. This fits with the view that the campaign messaging during the final 2 weeks 
was dominated by immigration and economic issues (Shipman 2016).
Figure 3 shows the patterns of change for selected items7 during wave 8. Again, 

















































































Big Business Leaving NHS
Fig. 3  Trends in perceived consequences of leaving (selected questions) Source: BES 2014–2016 inter-
net panel wave 8. Zero corresponds to “about the same”
6 Note that this implies that people were not just becoming more favourable to one side and so adjusting 
their perceptions to fit their vote intention. Further analysis of the correlations between individual-level 
change on different items shows a complex pattern.
7 The NHS item was not asked in wave 7.
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the same, both between waves 7 and 8 and within wave 8, suggests that people were 
reflecting on the issues separately and that their responses were not simply the prod-
uct of some latent propensity to support or oppose Brexit, as suggested by Clarke 
et al. (2017) and Evans et al. (2018).
Most lines show trendless fluctuations. For instance, the perceived consequences 
of Brexit for the NHS started positive and became more so but then dropped in the 
final 2  weeks. One or two have more noticeable trends, but they were not cumu-
latively to either side’s advantage. Remain’s advantage on international trade was 
neutralized, but the perceived consequences of leaving the EU for the economy as a 
whole got slightly worse. Overall there was little change, and so it mattered far more 
that opinion as to whether things would get better or worse was fairly balanced on 
most issues—except immigration, where there was consensus that it would drop on 
leaving the EU.
Our one prior hypothesis regarding the content of people’s Brexit expectations 
related to uncertainty: since campaigns are supposed to inform people, we posited 
a decline in the numbers saying they did not know what would happen in the event 
of a Leave vote (H3). It turns out that, indeed, on each issue there was a small drop 
of around a percentage point from wave 7 to wave 8 in the number of Don’t Knows. 
However, the consistency of the size of the drop and the trends over wave 8 across 
issues are so strong that it seems implausible that this was due to information and 
learning. That mechanism should have led to greater declines in Don’t Knows for 
some issues (perhaps those most discussed or those previously neglected) than oth-
ers. Instead, it looks like there was simply a tendency for those who responded later 
in the campaign to be slightly less likely to say Don’t Know across all items.
Similarly, there was an improvement in self-reported certainty between waves 
7 and 8. The percentage saying they were at least “quite sure” what would hap-
pen increased by 8 points when asked about a Leave win, and by five-points for a 
Remain win. However, there was no systematic trend in self-reported certainty as to 
what would happen for either outcome over the final 2 months. Overall then, there is 
little sign, notwithstanding H3, that the final 3 months of the campaign substantially 
improved voters’ perceived knowledge of the effects of either side winning. This is 
perhaps because the campaign added as much confusion as information, or because 
voters learnt that their prior uncertainty was well founded. But we should remember 
that this may be because the BES panel were already fairly well informed early on.
How did expectations at the end of the campaign influence the final vote?
We finally consider how changing expectations affected voting. Table  4 mirrors 
Table  2 in structure, but this time the dependent variable is the recall vote from 
the post-referendum wave 9 survey. The main expectation variables in both mod-
els are those from wave 8, instead of 7. Model 2 of Table 4 includes sociodemo-
graphic and attitudinal controls,8 lagged vote intention and lagged perceptions of 
8 As for the analysis in Table 2, the attitudinal control variables make barely any difference to the coef-
ficients of the expectation variables.
The UK’s referendum on EU membership of June 2016: how…
Table 4  Logistic regressions of 
post-referendum recall vote on 
late campaign expectations and 
uncertainty
(1 without controls) (2 with controls)
Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e.
Unemployment W8 − 0.36** (0.13) − 0.27* (0.12)
Int. trade W8 0.57*** (0.13) 0.30* (0.14)
Immigration W8 − 0.43*** (0.09) − 0.15 (0.11)
Terrorism risk W8 − 0.40*** (0.11) − 0.28* (0.13)
Workers’ rights W8 0.52*** (0.14) 0.40* (0.16)
Economy W8 0.89*** (0.14) 0.70*** (0.17)
Personal finance W8 − 0.07 (0.18) 0.32 (0.18)
NHS W8 0.43*** (0.12) 0.19 (0.14)
Brit influence W8 0.45*** (0.11) 0.27* (0.12)
Business leaves W8 − 0.78*** (0.11) − 0.51*** (0.12)
Scot independence W8 − 0.21* (0.09) − 0.15 (0.11)
DK unemployment W8 − 0.21 (0.24) − 0.32 (0.30)
DK int. trade W8 0.02 (0.22) 0.31 (0.25)
DK immigration W8 0.59* (0.26) 0.71* (0.32)
DK terrorism risk W8 − 0.06 (0.31) − 0.08 (0.29)
DK workers’ rights W8 − 0.25 (0.29) 0.15 (0.37)
DK economy W8 0.12 (0.32) 0.06 (0.29)
DK personal finance W8 − 0.09 (0.26) − 0.11 (0.26)
DK NHS W8 − 0.31 (0.31) − 0.39 (0.30)
DK Brit influence W8 − 0.17 (0.28) 0.09 (0.32)
DK business leaves W8 − 0.32 (0.21) − 0.54* (0.22)
DK Scot independence W8 0.19 (0.17) 0.19 (0.21)
Unemployment W7 0.23* (0.12)
Int. trade W7 − 0.21 (0.12)
immigration W7 0.03 (0.10)
Terrorism risk W7 0.14 (0.11)
Workers’ rights W7 − 0.21 (0.16)
Economy W7 − 0.06 (0.17)
Personal finance W7 0.10 (0.21)
Brit influence W7 0.14 (0.14)
Business leaves W7 − 0.08 (0.12)
Scot independence W7 − 0.05 (0.11)
DK unemployment W7 − 0.33 (0.28)
DK int. trade W7 − 0.16 (0.30)
DK immigration W7 0.39 (0.30)
DK terrorism risk W7 − 0.45 (0.31)
DK workers’ rights W7 0.04 (0.29)
DK economy W7 0.01 (0.30)
DK personal finance W7 0.21 (0.25)
DK Brit influence W7 0.08 (0.35)
DK business leaves W7 − 0.04 (0.22)
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the consequences of a Leave vote. The latter are included to provide a still more 
rigorous test of the causal relationship posited in H1. If the eventual vote choice 
was influenced by changing opinion during the campaign, the wave 8 expectations 
should be much more powerful predictors than the wave 7 expectations. That is 
precisely what we see. Had responses to the expectation questions just been noisy 
reflections of prior Euroscepticism then the wave 7 expectations should also be good 
predictors, or both should be weak because of multicollinearity. But that is not what 
the model shows. Modest though the changes in perceptions of the consequences of 
Brexit were, they clearly affected the eventual vote.
Comparing model 1 in Table 2 with model 1 of Table 4, we see broadly similar 
magnitudes of coefficients for the main variables. This suggests the (relative) impor-
tance of the issues changed little.
With regard to uncertainty (H2), the effects of saying Don’t Know are slightly 
changed in Table 4 compared with Table 2 depending on the issue, but not system-
atically and they are still mainly negative.9 The main tendency was for uncertainty 
over the consequences still to be associated with Remain voting, as expected.
Looking at those who responded to the BES in the final 2  weeks of the cam-
paign suggests that Leave won the campaign modestly. This fits with the trend in 
the opinion polls in Fig. 2. Among those who responded to wave 8 in the final fort-
night, 4% switched from Remain in April to Leave in June, but only 2% switched the 
other way. Such switching was related to perceived consequences of Brexit. Those 
moving from Leave to Remain tended to have become more convinced of the nega-
tive economic consequences of leaving and less convinced that immigration would 
Table 4  (continued) (1 without controls) (2 with controls)
Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e.
DK Scot independence W7 − 0.05 (0.23)
Intercept 0.27* (0.12) 0.13 (1.00)
Pseudo R-sq 0.56 0.71
No. of cases 6130 6076
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. Source: British Election Study 
internet panel, waves 7, 8 and 9, April–July 2016. Respondents 
from the final 2  weeks of the campaign only. Dependent variable: 
Leave = 1, Remain = 0, undecideds and refusals excluded. DK don’t 
know. See text for further details on variable coding. Although the 
parameters are not shown, model 2 includes all the control variables 
from Table 2 model 2 as controls but with wave 7 instead of wave 
6 vote intention, wave 8 leader ratings and immigration preferences. 
Government approval was not available for wave 8 so the wave 7 val-
ues are used
9 Immigration appears to have become a case where being unclear about the consequences of Brexit was 
associated with more Leave voting, but this needs to be understood relative to the high Remain vote for 
those who thought that immigration levels would not change after Brexit (Curtice 2017b).
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fall. The reverse is true of those who switched the other way. Those who changed 
their vote changed their expectations in a corresponding direction and much more 
than those who did not change their vote intention. Perhaps most telling is the extent 
to which those who switched from Remain to Leave simultaneously took a much 
more favourable opinion of the economic consequences of leaving. This suggests 
primarily a failure of the Remain campaign to persuade swing voters of their main 
argument.
While vote switching between April and June was more towards Leave, the BES 
data also suggest that between the final few days of the campaign and the vote there 
was a small late swing to Remain of about 1 percentage point. While this is too 
modest to claim that there was reversion to the status quo, equally there is no sup-
port for the notion that undecided voters came to perceive Leave as the safer option.
Our final hypothesis, H4, supposes that the eventual vote choice of those who 
were previously undecided would depend on the source of their indecision. The 
confirmation of H2 in Table 4 suggests that those who did not know which side to 
vote for late in the campaign because they were uncertain as to the consequences 
of Brexit would be more likely, if they did vote, to support Remain on referendum 
day. Overall those who were still undecided in the final 2 weeks but did nevertheless 
vote split 53:47 for Remain. The split was more favourable for Remain the more fre-
quently they responded “Don’t Know” to the expectations questions, but because of 
small numbers, not statistically significantly so.
Conclusions
We can draw out conclusions from the preceding analysis regarding two broad ques-
tions. First, what do we learn about this referendum in particular—about why Leave 
won the 2016 Brexit referendum? Second, what do we learn about referendum 
dynamics in general—what are the implications of the present analysis that deserve 
to be studied comparatively?
Regarding the first question, Leave won only narrowly, so many factors with very 
small effects could have determined the outcome. Such factors include many vari-
ables we have not discussed here, including partisanship, leader evaluations, ideol-
ogy, and turnout. There is little sense in trying to single out any one thing as deci-
sively switching the result.
But we can say that most of those factors appear to have been at least mediated 
by expectations about the consequences of leaving the EU. These expectations were 
the most powerful and proximate factors affecting vote choice, regardless of whether 
they were based on accurate or misleading sources.
Supporting the view that UK voters see EU membership in purely instrumental 
terms, our analysis shows that Leave would have won if the public thought little change 
would result from leaving the EU. That is, however, on average across a range of issues. 
Immigration is a big exception, on which those who thought that rates of net in migra-
tion would be just as high after Brexit were likely to vote Remain.
 S. D. Fisher, A. Renwick 
Economic issues were the most important factor for the public. The key question 
is not why the public did not care enough about the economic consequences to gener-
ate a Remain victory, but why they did not sufficiently believe that the consequences 
would be negative: the public were much clearer that immigration would fall than that 
the economy would suffer in the event of a Leave vote. Had people expected economic 
harm from Brexit as much as they expected falling immigration, the UK would have 
voted strongly to Remain. The Leave vote was primarily based on the expectation that 
Brexit would reduce immigration—a conclusion also supported by analysis of high-
quality face-to-face probability sample data (Curtice 2017b).
Over the course of the campaign people became more likely to believe both that 
Brexit would have negative economic consequences and that immigration would fall. 
But overall, we see little evidence that voters’ confidence that they understood the con-
sequences of Brexit rose substantially. In this sense, the campaign failed. As expected—
and in contrast to the post-referendum conclusions of campaigners—voters who were 
uncertain about the consequences of Brexit were more likely to back the status quo than 
were voters who thought Brexit would make little difference.
These findings help to elucidate the dynamics of opinion in the Brexit referendum. 
As indicated by our second question, they are also of much broader comparative sig-
nificance. Our conclusion that issues mattered in this vote (in line with H1) is not sur-
prising: it further supports existing comparative evidence that issue voting matters in 
high-salience referendums. More original are our insights regarding uncertainty (H2). 
Though it is widely presumed that uncertainty about the consequences of a referendum 
decision generates support for the status quo, we believe that our approach to model-
ling voters’ uncertainty offers the first rigorous examination of this proposition. We see 
clear support for the proposition in the Brexit referendum. This should be a topic for 
further comparative research in the future.
There is also scope for further consideration of how different issues and expecta-
tions matter in conjunction with each other as opposed to independently, and how they 
may matter differently for different kinds of people. For instance, we noted earlier that 
government supporters put more weight on economic considerations, but it is not clear 
why. It could be that, by emphasizing economic consequences, the government raised 
the salience of the economy more among its own supporters, but it could also be that 
Conservative voters tend to be more concerned about macroeconomic outcomes than 
issues such as worker’s rights. There are also other possible explanations. Puzzles such 
as this deserve further investigation. Here, we hope we have adequately shown that 
voter expectations, and the lack of them, matter, even across a wide range of different 
economic and social outcomes.
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